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ABSTRACT
This paper presents SecuriTAS, a tool to engineer adap-
tive security. It allows software designers to model security
concerns together with the requirements of a system. This
model is then used at runtime to analyze changes in security
concerns and select the best set of security controls necessary
to protect the system.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Security is concerned with the protection of valuable as-
sets from harm. Assets can be physical objects (e.g., lap-
top), sensitive information (e.g., user credentials), or intan-
gible properties (e.g., reputation). Assets have a central
role in security and may influence other security concerns,
such as threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, risk, security goals,
and security controls. Critical assets and system vulnera-
bilities can change at runtime, and this may affect related
security concerns. For example, if new assets need to be
protected or assets become more valuable, their related se-
curity goals may become more critical. Risk of attacks can
also increase if new vulnerabilities are discovered in a sys-
tem. In both cases, the security controls that are currently
present in the system may no longer be effective. To address
this, we have proposed adaptive security [4], which aims to
continue to protect valuable assets from harm, even when
security concerns change dynamically. To prevent possible
attacks, adaptive security adjusts active security controls.
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Access control systems [3, 1] can benefit from adaptive
security. Unfortunately, beyond the early stages of develop-
ment of such systems, what should be protected (assets) and
why particular access controls are applied (security goals and
requirements) are often ignored. This may introduce diffi-
culties to configure security controls (access control policies)
according to what needs to be protected, and adapt existing
policies when assets or vulnerabilities change.
This paper presents SecuriTAS1, a novel tool to support
adaptive security from requirements modeling to system ex-
ecution. SecuriTAS can analyze the impact of changes in
assets and vulnerabilities on security concerns, and identify
an appropriate set of security controls necessary to protect
the system. Potential users are software designers and sys-
tem adminstrators who have to configure the system and its
security controls. SecuriTAS is demonstrated through a set
of access control scenarios. The rest of the paper illustrates
the steps necessary to engineer adaptive security, describes
the functionalities provided by SecuriTAS, and provides a
demonstration our tool.
2. ENGINEERING ADAPTIVE SECURITY
We suggest engineering adaptive security in three steps [4].
a) Modeling the security concerns together with the system
requirements. We use a KAOS [5] goal model to repre-
sent functional and non-functional requirements and a threat
model to represent threats and attacks. It explicitly repre-
sents security goals and associated vulnerabilities. In partic-
ular, security goals can be associated with security controls,
which can mitigate modeled vulnerabilities. An asset model
represents assets and their relationships. Assets are linked
to the security goals and associated threats.
b) Configuring adaptive security. We generate a fuzzy
causal network [2] (FCN) from our asset, threat, and goal
models. Each node of the FCN is associated with a security
concern and has a specific semantics. For example, a node
associated with an asset represents its value. The links of
the network identify positive and negative causal relation-
ships among security concerns. For example, a link between
a security control and a vulnerability indicates how the secu-
rity control reduces the probability of that vulnerability to
occur. The FCN is used at runtime to analyze the security
risk and evaluate the utility of all possible configurations of
security controls. Furthermore, we identify monitored assets
and contextual factors, which may change existing system
vulnerabilities. We also map the security controls specified
1The tool and the installation guide can be download it at
http://code.google.com/p/securitas/downloads/list.
in the goal model to the concrete security functions that are
implemented to protect the system.
c) Applying Adaptive Security at Runtime. We instrument
the activities of a MAPE (Monitor-Analysis-Plan-Execute)
loop, by using the configuration generated in the previous
step. Monitoring detects the changes that take place in as-
sets and contextual factors that may affect vulnerabilities.
Suitable probes are provided by the system to notify the
monitor when changes in asset and contextual factors take
place. Analysis updates the value of each node of the FCN,
by aggregating the contributions of the incoming links. In
this way, the security risk and the utility of all configurations
of security controls can be re-estimated. Planning selects
the configuration of security controls with the best utility.
Execution applies the security functions associated with the
best configuration of security controls on the system.
3. A WALK THROUGH SECURITAS
SecuriTAS is composed of the Graphical Modeler and
the Adaptation Manager. The Graphical Modeler (see
Figure 1) is a visual editor to create the asset, goal, and
threat models (Step a). It is implemented as an Eclipse plug-
in, by using EMF (Eclipse Modeling Framework) and GMF
(Graphical Modeling Framework). The Graphical Modeler
provides three views. The Package Explorer (1) shows the
projects in the workbench and the models contained in each
project. The Editor (2) shows the diagram of a selected
model and allows us to edit it, by adding/removing elements.
The Palette (3) provides the elements and connections that
can be dragged and dropped in the model shown by the ed-
itor. The Properties view (4) allows us to view and edit the
properties of the element/connection selected in the Editor
view. After the asset, goal, and threat models are completed,
the Graphical Modeler allows us to generate the correspond-
ing FCN and map each security control to the corresponding
security function implemented in the system (Step b). Mon-
itored assets and contextual factors are also identified from
the designed models. This information is sent to the Adap-
tation Manager to configure its activities at runtime.
1
2 3
4
Figure 1: The Graphical Modeler.
The Adaptation Manager implements the activities of the
MAPE loop to apply adaptive security at runtime (Step c).
It exposes a monitoring interface to be notified when assets
or context conditions, which affect vulnerabilities, change. It
updates the nodes of the FCN, identifies the configuration of
security controls with the best utility, and applies the corre-
sponding security functions on the system. The Adaptation
Manager is implemented as a web application. It also pro-
vides a dashboard (Figure 2) to load and visualize the FCN,
update the values of assets and context conditions that may
affect vulnerabilities, and visualize the current state of the
system (1). If this last functionality is selected, the Input
view (2) shows the current assets (and their values) and the
context conditions that may affect vulnerabilities. While,
the Output view (3) describes the security functions that
are currently applied on the system.
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Figure 2: The Adaptation Manager dashboard.
4. DEMONSTRATION
The demonstration scenarios regulate the access to an of-
fice for a set of employees. The office contains valuable assets
(e.g., patent proposal, computer), while employees can have
one of these roles: professor, postdoc, or student. In this
scenario, SecuriTAS is used to grant the access to students
and postdocs according to the availability of valuable as-
sets and the persons that are currently present in the office.
The demonstration of our tool is organized in three parts.
First, we model the security concerns and the requirements
of the system through the Graphical Modeler. In particu-
lar, we create the asset, threat, and goal models of the dy-
namic access control scenario. Second, we use the Graphical
Modeler to configure adaptive security activities. In partic-
ular, we generate the FCN from the asset, threat, and goal
models, and associate the security controls with the secu-
rity functions implemented in the system. Third, we show
how adaptive security is applied at runtime, by simulating
a dynamic access control scenario.
4.1 Modeling assets, threats, and goals
The asset model represents assets and their relationships.
Figure 3 depicts the asset model associated with our dy-
namic access control scenario. As assets, we consider the
(patent) Proposal, which has a high value (0.6), the Com-
puter, which has no value (0.0), since it is not initially lo-
cated in the office, and the Office itself, which has a no
initial value (0.0). The value of the Office can also in-
crease, depending on whether other valuable assets are lo-
cated in it (see association isContained between assets Pro-
posal/Computer and Office).
The threat model represents the motivations of the attack-
ers to harm the assets in the system boundary. The critical-
ity of a threat directly depends on the value of the asset to
be harmed. Threats can be hierarchically decomposed into
sub-threats, until they are operationalized as attacks. The
main motivation of an attacker is to descrease the reputa-
tion of the professor. This threat can be achieved by stealing
the computer (attack Steal Computer) or by illegitimately
modifying or copying the proposal (through attacks Change
Proposal and Copy Proposal).
Figure 3: Asset Model.
The goal model represents the main objectives of the sys-
tem. A goal can be decomposed into sub-goals, until it can
be directly associated with a functional/non-functional re-
quirement. Functional requirements can be decomposed into
system operations. Vulnerabilities are explicitly represented
in the goal model and may be brought by system operations.
Vulnerabilities can also increase the probability of success
of attacks. The main objective of the system is to support
research. In particular, proposals must be completed and
students must be supervised. To supervise students, the
professor, the postdoc, and the student himself must have
access to the office (goals Stud/Prof/Postdoc Enters Of-
fice). All these goals are achieved through operation Enter.
In case the professor is not in the office (see contextual fac-
tor Professor not in office in Figure 4), operation Enter
brings a vulnerability, since unautorized employees can ac-
cess to the office. This vulnerability enables attacks Steal
Computer, Change Proposal, and Copy Proposal.
Figure 4: Partial view of the goal model, represent-
ing the security requirements.
Security goals represent the CIAA (confidentiality, integrity,
availability and accountability) properties. The priority (crit-
icality) of a security goal may depend on the value of the
asset that needs to be protected. Security goals have a hi-
erarchical structure and can be gradually decomposed into
security controls. Figure 4 depicts a simplified view of our
security goals. We want to guarantee Accountability of the
Office (see Properties View in Figure 4). To this aim, Au-
thorization and Authentication should be provided to
regulate the access to the office. Authentication can be
performed in three different ways (security controls): Pass-
word, Fingerprint, and RFID (smart card). Authorization
is supported by revoking the permission to enter to the stu-
dent and/or the postdoc (see Revoke Student and Revoke
Postdoc). Security controls are linked to the vulnerabil-
ities they try to mitigate. A weight can be assigned to
this link depending, on the effectiveness of the countermea-
sure. For example, Revoke Postdoc and Revoke Student
mitigate vulnerability Access of unauthorized employees
of a factor 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. The security con-
trols applied to satisfy security goals can have a negative
impact on other goals. For example, Revoke Student and
Revoke PostDoc have a negative impact on goals Stud En-
ter Office and PostDoc Enter Office, respectively. Se-
curity controls Password and Fingerprint also have a neg-
ative impact on the usability of the system. Note that
configuring the relationships between security concerns is
an hard task that relies on the expertise of the system de-
signer/administrator.
4.2 Configuring Adaptive Security Activities
The Graphical Modeler allows us to generate the FCN
and associate the security controls represented in the goal
model with the security functions that can be applied on the
system. To generate the FCN, in the Graphical Modeler,
we right-click on the project (AccessControl) that contains
the corresponding asset, threat, and goal models, and select
option “Generate FCN”. To generate the mappings between
the security controls and the security functions, we right-
click on project Access Control and select option“Generate
Sec Controls”. Then, a pop-up window appears and allows
us to select one of the implemented security function for
each security control.
4.3 Applying Adaptive Security at Runtime
We use the AET62 NFC Reader to monitor who accesses
to/exits from the office and which assets are moved to/re-
moved from the office. If an employee swipes his/her smart
card on the NFC reader and he/she is not in the office,
he/she is allowed to enter only in case he/she has the per-
mission to access to the office. We also use smart cards to
tag assets in the system. For instance, in case an asset is
outside the office and we swipe its card, it means that this
asset is moved to the office. In our scenario, we tagged the
computer with a smart card to monitor when it is put in the
office. We also developed an application (NFCManager) to
control the status of the NFC reader and notify the Adap-
tation Manager when an asset (computer) is added to the
office or contextual conditions (presence of the professor in
the office) change. The NFCManager also exposes a graph-
ical interface to show what are the available assets in the
office (and their value) and which employees tried to access
to the office.
The NFC reader also supports smart card authentication.
When one of the employee swipes his/her card, the NFC-
Manager checks on the DB whether the employee’s role has
the permission to access to the office. The door is opened
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Figure 5: Scenario 2.
only in case the employee’s role has the permission to en-
ter. To implement the smart card authorization we store
a record of each employee that tracks his/her role(s) and
tag. We also store another record for each role to track the
corresponding permissions. This way, every time it is nec-
essary to change the permissions associated with a role, the
corresponding record in the DB will be updated.
The dynamic access control example is composed of dif-
ferent scenarios. In all scenarios we assume to have three
employees (Claudio, Liliana, and Bashar) who have respec-
tively the role of student, postdoc and professor. The initial
causal network received from the Graphical Modeler repre-
sents the initial situation. In the first scenario, the office
only contains the patent proposal (value 0.6) and Bashar
is not in the office. After we select function “Modify Input
Values”, the Adaptation Manager recomputes the best con-
figuration of security controls that should be applied on the
system. In this case, it select a single factor authentication
(via smart card) and grants the permission to access to the
office only to postdocs and not to professors. In this case,
when Liliana tries to enter in the office, the access is granted.
Instead, when Claudio tries to access to the office, the access
control system does not allow him to enter.
In the second scenario the Computer is put in the of-
fice, since its corresponding smart card is swiped on the
NFC reader (see Figure 5(2)). The Adaptation Manager
is notified of this change and updates the state of the sys-
tem, by setting the value of the Computer to 0.6 (see Input
view in Figure 5(1)). After we select function “Modify In-
put Values”, the Adaptation Manager recomputes the best
configuration of security controls that should be applied on
the system. As Bashar is still not in the office, the risk
that the computer is stolen increases and more restrictive
security controls should be applied. In this case, the Adap-
tation Manager selects a single factor authentication (via
smart card) and revokes the permission to access to the of-
fice to both postdocs and students (see Output view in Fig-
ure 5(1)). In this case, when both Liliana and Claudio try
to access to the office, the access control system does not
allow them to enter (see Figure 5(3)).
In the third scenario, Bashar accesses to the office by swip-
ing his card. The Adaptation Manager is notified of this
change and updates the state of the system, by setting the
value of context condition“Professor not in the office”to 0.0.
After we select function “Modify Input Values”, the Adap-
tation Manager recomputes the best configuration of secu-
rity controls that should be applied on the system. Since
this change reduces the probability of the vulnerabilities to
be exploited by potential attacks, the Adaptation Manager
selects a single factor authentication (via smart card) and
grants the permission to access to the office to both postdocs
and students. In this case, when both Liliana and Claudio
try to access to the office, the access control system allows
them to enter.
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